Sound Bites Of Reality

THE CENTURION CHRONICLE
Special Issue – Jun 2010

SOUND BITES OF REALITY
(not bits of mutiny-on-the-Bounty)

The General McChrystal affair is clearly a case of sound bites of reality, rather than one of mutiny-on-the-Bounty. It reveals the glaring disconnection between the realities on the ground in Afghanistan, and the political pipedreams being spun back in Washington. And those realities are that, despite nine years of effort by us and our NATO allies, the Afghans have yet to get their political act together to put their national house in order.

To be blunt about it, they’ve been playing roulette all those years with our soldiers blood and lives, and, of course, our taxpayers’ dollars; and, with no end in sight to their continuing gaming of the situation. So it shouldn’t have surprised anyone that things came to a head in this manner. Two successive administrations have gone along with this sorry state of affairs, without resolving the problem. The odds are that it can’t be resolved, not so long as the Afghans continue gaming the situation they way have; and, not so long as our politicos plan strategies based upon potential political benefits to be gained back here at home, rather than on what might best work to secure Afghanistan. Meanwhile, our soldiers’ lives are the price being paid for that situation.

A gross example of that are the public pronouncements of the President, the Vice President, and others in the Administration, about a 2011 withdrawal date for our troops. Militarily, and otherwise, it was an idiotic thing to do. Why tell our adversaries when and how we might leave? It strengthens the Taliban’s position, the few Afghanis who might make a stronger effort to rebuild their nation have been left hanging out to dry, and our troops on the ground, instinctively, have been left wondering – what the hell are we fighting for here?- which no amount of spin, nuancing, or glossing over about it being about “freedom”, ”democracy”, and “mom’s apple pie” can overcome.

Given Afghanistan’s historical matrix of being a tribal and warlord society, from the moment we stormed into it, in retaliation for 9/11, to clobber the Taliban thug regime there and its al Qaeda associates, we based our entire nation re-building efforts on the false premise we would be able to create a strong and effective central government structure for it.. None of our predecessors were ever able to do so. Not the Persians, not Alexander the Great, not the British, not the Soviets, not even the Taliban. The only thing any of them were able to do was to impose greater warlord overlordship over some of the lesser local ones, and always not for very long.

But that’s not the American way. We’re conditioned to overwhelmingly storm in, kick ass, then get the hell out as quickly as possible, and sooner rather than later. We’ve never cared much for becoming overlords ourselves, especially if it means we have to remain one for any length of time. It’s this underlying aspect of our national character which has plagued our efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

General Petraeus’ anti-insurgent success in the Anwar Province of Iraq worked because it was focused on local village and provincial interests, not a national one. Once tribal and other leaders realized that, with our direct military support, they could not only defend themselves, but also otherwise fend for themselves without much help from a so-called central government, the province was pacified, and largely remains so to this day. In effect, it was the application of the – Magnificent Seven- concept, on a much large scale. It’s a concept that works.

In Afghanistan, besides having a less than reliable central government to work with, we have a multi-pronged situation. The first prong is the ongoing purely military one of suppressing the Taliban ability to come raiding in from neighboring Pakistan. The second prong is concurrently suppressing, if not wiping out, as much of its local elements in key provinces such as Helmand and Kandahar. The third, and most critical prong, is applying direct support at the local village level to activate self-directed efforts to defend themselves against Taliban incursions, and to improve their economic and living conditions as well, all on their own. Such efforts have to be local, and have to be able to deliver immediate results local villagers can see. Anything less won’t cut it.

The point is, if local people are helped to take control of their affairs, and helped to use their own resources and skills to improve their conditions, they will be much more inclined to fight to the death against anyone trying to take that away from them.

Unfortunately, the ability of our military to provide such support there is hampered by political considerations back here at home. Among other things, those in political power today have boxed themselves into the no-win situation we face in Afghanistan today. All because, as far back as the 2006 mid-term election cycle, they were busy stampeding the electorate to vote them into power because, if it did so, they would have all our troops out of these Middle East adventures within 100 days, etc., etc. This was again repeated in the 2008 presidential elections, although in much more hedging language by then. Now, facing a serious electoral backlash in the 2010 mid-term election cycle, their politically driven objectives here at home are what is getting in the way of accomplishing any kind of success in Afghanistan. The General McChrystal affair has simply been the symptom of frustration with that situation.

Whether General Petraeus, as his replacement, can somehow pull another rabbit out of that sorry hat, is an open question. If he can, and for our troops sake we sincerely hope so, it won’t be because of anything our Washington politicos have contributed to the cause.

Such are the sound bites of reality in Afghanistan.

CENTURION